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Abstract 
 
We study the effect of state ownership on the market-to-book ratios of publicly traded 
European utilities observed from 1994 to 2005. We find that when the company is 
subject to independent regulation, state ownership is positively associated with firm 
value. This effect is strong and significant in countries where weak checks and 
balances and political fragmentation do not constrain the power of the executive. We 
conclude that where political institutions are weak, politicians imperfectly delegate 
powers to regulatory agencies in order to benefit state-owned firms. 
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 “How can the state regulate the firms it also runs?” 
The Economist (2012, p. 17) 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Three decades after the start of the largest transfer of ownership in the history of the 
corporation privatization is fading away. Since the turn of the century, state assets divestiture has 
been slowing down in most developed economies and advancing somehow in emerging countries 
due to the initial floatation of large State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). However, around the world the 
most common outcome of this process is government control of (partly) privatized firms, a 
qualifying feature of the so-called “rise of state capitalism”.1 Interestingly, and contrary to 
conventional wisdom, residual control rights by the government do not affect negatively the value 
of the firm. Recent evidence has shown that partial privatization improves financial and operating 
performance (Gupta, 2005) and that firms under government control tend to be more valuable than 
fully privatized firms (Beltratti et al., 2007; Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009). 
Public utilities, i.e. firms operating in network industries, such as energy, 
telecommunication, transports, and water, had a great bearing in past privatization processes. In 
most developed countries, sales advanced in parallel with deep structural reforms promoting 
liberalization and regulation of former state monopolies to boost efficiency and private investment.2  
In the European Union, for example, the Commission urged the member states to establish 
Independent Regulatory Authorities (IRAs), i.e. autonomous public organizations to which 
governments delegate the regulatory policy. Yet, government control of privatized/regulated firms 
is commonly observed also in public utilities.3 Interestingly, we observe a similar effect of residual 
state ownership on firm value: higher state ownership is associated to higher firm value, but this 
happens only when the firm becomes subject to an IRA. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of market-
to-book ratios of European telecom and energy utilities before and after the official establishment of 
respective IRAs. We notice that, in the three-year period after the event, state-controlled firms 
outperform privately controlled firms by 15 percent on average. 
Aim of this paper is twofold: first, we evaluate empirically the effect of government 
ownership on the market value of public utilities, controlling for other possible determinants. 
Second, should this relation exist, we try to establish the channel linking government ownership to 
                                                 
1 According to a recent report on state capitalism, the combined market value of global SOEs is more than $2 trillion 
and total employment around 6 million (The Economist, January 21st, 2012).   
2 Utilities accounted for two thirds of the privatization revenues raised in European countries from 1977 to date 
(Privatization Barometer, 2010). 
3 In the European Union, 85 per cent of privatized utilities are under government control (Roland, 2008). 
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the valuation of companies subject to independent regulation. To this purpose, we use an original 
panel dataset of 88 publicly traded network utilities from 14 EU countries observed from 1994 to 
2005, which includes 10 of the top 30 companies in terms of market capitalization within the 
European Industrial Sector (Mediobanca Investment Bank, 2009). Estimates rely on both cross-
country and within-country variation in the data around regulatory reforms and political institutions. 
Why should governments own firms? Conventional wisdom and a bulk of theoretical 
literature suggest that politicians are “bad owners” of corporations as they typically impose 
objectives that destroy shareholders’ value (Shapiro and Willig, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
Bennedsen, 2000).4 At the same time, politicians are also viewed as “bad regulators” as their 
interference may lead to time-inconsistent regulatory decisions and to the expropriation of utilities’ 
sunk investments (Stigler, 1971). These arguments provide the rationale for the privatization of 
SOEs, insofar as the transfer of ownership rights to the private sector improves incentives and 
boosts operating performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001), and for the setting up of IRAs, in 
order to foster the credibility of regulatory commitments (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Baldwin and 
Cave, 1999). 
However, the existence of a legally (de jure) independent regulator is not sufficient to 
ensure real (de facto) independent decisions, because genuine independence hinges, among other 
things, upon the real powers that the political system delegates to the agency, in other words upon 
the residual rights to intervene in regulatory decisions retained by incumbent politicians.5 We label 
reluctant regulation the institutional setting when regulatory powers are delegated to a formally 
independent regulator, but subject de facto to political interference. 
Reluctant regulation matters when the government retains significant ownership rights in 
regulated firms. In this case, politicians may wield their powers to obtain favourable regulatory 
decisions that boost the utilities’ profitability, and this in turn allows the government, for example, 
to raise additional fiscal revenues via extra-dividends and to avoid tax increases, spending cuts or 
other politically costly decisions or to promote “national champions”. The expectation that the 
government gives a “helping hand” indirectly via regulation boosts the market value of utilities 
under mixed (private-public) ownership, with private shareholders sharing the financial rent 
provided for by the public shareholder.  
                                                 
4 In this perspective, privatization can be seen as a safeguard against the opportunistic behavior of politicians 
(Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). See also the recent survey by Martimort (2006). 
5 Alesina and Tabellini (2008), studying the normative criteria that allocate tasks between politicians and bureaucrats, 
point out that regulation of public utilities is an example of “policies that lend themselves to bureaucratic delegation, 
since they pit special interests against those of consumers as a whole”. However, such a delegation comes to a cost in 
terms of the loss of political control over the industry leading to imperfect delegation of power. In fact, “institutions are 
more likely to be designed so as to deliver maximal rents at the lowest risk for the incumbent politician” (page 444-
445).  
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To establish the link between residual state ownership and regulated firms’ market value, we 
focus on reluctant regulation as possible channel by exploiting the heterogeneity in the ownership 
patterns and in the regulatory settings. The seminal study by Levy and Spiller (1994) shows that 
political interference in regulatory decisions is more likely when the institutional constraints on 
executive discretion are weak. In this case, regulatory commitment is less credible since political 
powers can more easily overturn administrative decisions. Formal institutional arrangements that 
constrain executive discretion typically include the explicit separation of powers, an effective 
“checks and balance” system between the different branches of the government, and an electoral 
system that enhances party proliferation and political fragmentation. We thus expect reluctant 
regulation to surface where institutional constraints are weak providing governments’ incentives to 
retain higher stakes in regulated firms. Where instead one country’s institutional endowment fosters 
genuine independent regulation, residual public ownership should be completely neutral with 
respect to firm value.  
Our empirical results are consistent with our predictions. We find that residual state 
ownership positively affects the market value of regulated firms and that this effect is significant 
only where political institutions do not effectively restrain governments’ power. Importantly, in a 
model where we take fully into account the endogeneity of residual state ownership and 
independent regulation, we show that political institutions affect firm value only indirectly, and that 
residual stakes by the government are the only channel through which institutions affect the 
valuation of regulated firms. Results survive when we account for sectors characteristics, country 
specificity, thresholds of ownership and control rights, and for the extent of market liberalization, 
supporting the view that reluctant regulation is a fundamental driver of the performance of public 
utilities.    
Several papers have addressed related issues. For example, some empirical studies have 
shown that political institutions are significant determinants of structural reforms such as regulatory 
decisions (Duso, 2005; Guerriero, 2011), market liberalization (Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010; Duso 
and Seldeslachts, 2010) and privatisation (Li and Xu, 2002; Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009; Dinc and 
Gupta, 2011).6 In a similar vein, Edwards and Waverman (2006) have addressed the link between 
government ownership and regulatory independence. Using a sample of 15 EU incumbent 
telecommunications operators tracked from 1997 to 2003, the authors show that public ownership 
of the incumbent positively affects wholesale rates, suggesting that governments influence 
regulatory outcomes in favour of incumbents where they have substantially invested in. However, 
                                                 
6 In a different, but related field, Albalate et al. (2012) study the political institution determinants of the provision of 
public goods, with an application to military spending. 
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this effect is mitigated in presence of institutional features enhancing regulatory independence from 
the government.  
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first systematic analysis on the impact of state 
ownership on regulated firms’ market value in the EU introducing political institution and the novel 
concept of reluctant regulation as explanatory factor of this empirical relation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the institutional 
context. In Section 3 we present our research design and the estimation strategy. In Section 4, we 
describe our data, specifically the sample, the firm level data and the regulatory, ownership and 
political variables. In Section 5 we present the empirical results from estimating the market value 
regression, while in Section 6 we account for the effect of different political institutions. In Section 
7 we present some robustness checks. Section 8 concludes. 
2. The Institutional Reforms in the Utility Sectors in the European Union 
Following a big wave of nationalization after the Second World War, vertically integrated, 
stated-owned, monopolies largely dominated European network industries. Under this regime, 
utilities were an operational branch of the government and instructed to provide universal services 
at low prices, absorb unemployment, and invest in infrastructure. The government in turn played the 
dual role of owner and “regulator,” and set tariffs, quality standards, and investment levels. This 
arrangement however created ill-performing and highly inefficient public monopolies (Megginson 
and Netter, 2001). 
Starting from the mid 1980’s in the UK, and early 1990’s in the rest of Europe, the 
European Commission promoted a gradual liberalization and regulatory process intended to 
improve the efficiency and service quality of EU public utilities and increase their investments. In 
particular, the European Commission enacted a number of directives aimed at setting up a common 
regulatory framework for EU member states, which were in turn required to transpose these 
directives into national legislation.  
One of the most important of these EU-driven reforms is perhaps the institution of IRAs, 
charged with the duty to regulate the activity of network industries and to discipline the potential 
conflict of interest between the government and state-controlled utilities. Typically, delegated 
regulatory tasks involve price-setting decisions both at retail and wholesale level - whenever access 
to essential facility is needed to develop market competition -, the definition of entry conditions, the 
imposition of quality standards and all the technical rules to use or access to existing infrastructures.  
The IRAs ought to operate with their own specialized staff and detailed mandate, 
independently of ministries or government departments. The European Commission especially 
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urged member states’ governments to establish national independent regulators at least in economy-
wide sectors like energy and telecommunications, sometimes under the threat of infringement 
procedures before the European Court of Justice.7 Nevertheless, the European Commission left the 
decision about the definition and the scope of the delegated powers entirely in the hands of national 
governments. This process of delegation led to the creation of formally independent (de jure) 
agencies. However, de facto independence clearly hinged upon how this delegation process was 
implemented in each member state. Indeed, agencies usually are not fully independent because 
political executives often retain ultimate responsibility for their activities (Verhoest et al., 2012). 
As for privatization, the European Commission left the decision about the ownership of 
regulated energy utilities entirely in the hands of national governments (see Bortolotti et al., 2003). 
As a result, after more than a decade, many large EU utilities are still controlled by central and local 
governments, especially as far as France, Germany, and Italy, and the energy sector, are concerned.  
The implementation of these institutional reforms (modern regulation, privatization, market 
liberalization) varies considerably across EU countries and sectors. Table 1 reports the year in 
which an IRA was established, the timing of transposition of sectoral directives in each Member 
State, and the allocation of proceeds from privatization over time. The data refer only to energy and 
telecoms because in water supply and transport infrastructure a common regulatory framework is 
still under construction, IRAs still do not exist (so regulation is carried out by government 
committees or within ministries) and privatization process are lagging behind. As shown in Table 1, 
in most member states, privatizations in energy and telecoms followed the implementation of EC 
directives on the adoption of regulatory framework and the inception of IRAs. 
Reforms are most advanced in the telecom industry, where liberalization started in 1987 
with the publication of the Green Paper for the Development of the Common Market for 
telecommunication services and equipment. The Green Paper was followed by a sequence of 
directives, starting from Directive 90/388 on “Competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services,” which established the institution of national IRAs in each Member State. Table 1 shows 
that independent regulatory agencies now operate in virtually all member states: in the U.K. the 
IRA was established in 1984, while in the other EU countries IRAs were set up in mid nineties. As 
for firm ownership, at the onset of the liberalization process, the European Commission raised 
concerns about residual state ownership in telecoms companies.8 As of 2005, most telecom 
                                                 
7 Recently, the European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Luxemburg, Romania and Slovakia 
regarding the telecoms authority’s independence and its internal organization. See European Commission (2010; p. 44). 
8 “In some Member States, concerns are reported that the structures in place do not ensure that regulatory decisions are 
not influenced by State ownership considerations. In these cases, the necessary separation of the control of the 
incumbent and the regulatory powers should be re-examined (Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Ireland, France)” 
(European Commission, 1999, pag. 15). 
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companies were (at least partially) privatized and governments held majority of control only in the 
German and Swedish incumbents.  
Market liberalization reforms are well ahead also in the energy sector, where the majority of 
electric and gas utilities are subject to regulation by an IRAs. The milestone legislation is Directive 
96/92 for the electricity, followed by Directive 98/30 for the gas market; these directives aimed at 
gradually introducing competition in generation and retail segments, as well as at unbundling the 
various segments of the energy value chain. Importantly, these directives established independent 
national regulatory agencies: the U.K. was again the first country in Europe to establish an IRA in 
1989, the other countries followed from 1995 to 2000, while Germany was the last one to set up an 
IRA for energy utilities in 2006. As regards firm ownership, the only fully privatized energy 
utilities are British. At the opposite side stands the French government, which, with its larger than 
80% stake in both Gaz de France and Electricitè de France (and the 32% stake in Telecom France), 
appears as the most reluctant to release control in regulated utilities.  
Finally, in water supply and in transportation infrastructure (docks and ports, airports and 
freight motorways) structural reforms still lag behind. With the exception of the U.K., most water 
and transportation utilities are still controlled by central and local governments and subject to 
regulation by ministries or other branches of the government rather than by independent regulatory 
agencies.  
3. Research Design  
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
Our initial question is: how does ownership affect firm value when an IRA is in place?  
When there is not an IRA in place, self-interested politicians may exploit state-controlled 
utilities to extract rents from social investment and employment programs that result in low 
profitability and inefficiency (see for example Megginson and Netter, 2001). In this case, private 
investors will typically shun regulated firms.  
The establishment of IRAs – such as the process promoted by the European Commission 
during the 90s- functionally separates the (dual) role of the state as typical large shareholder of 
utilities and as regulator of the industry. The delegation act, formally shifting the regulatory powers 
from the political sphere to an independent bureaucratic entity, curbs ex ante political interference 
and opportunistic behavior by self-interested politicians (Levy and Spiller, 1984; Armstrong and 
Sappington, 2007). The enhanced credibility of regulatory commitments will attract private 
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investment, allowing the opening up of capital to external investors and - should commitments be 
sustained over time - full privatization (Perotti, 1995). 
In theory, if regulators were de facto independent, IRAs should be able to thwart any attempt 
to “capture” by politicians, regardless of the private or public status of the firm (Laffont and Tirole, 
1986, Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). However, if regulators are de iure but not de facto 
independent, politicians wield regulatory powers and have incentives to retain a stake in the firm 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Laffont, 1996). Indeed, by keeping regulators on their toes, politicians 
may obtain a favorable regulatory treatment of the state-owned utility, such as a soft regulatory 
stance (higher tariffs, higher entry barriers, etc.) in order to increase the firm’s profits that will 
accrue, via dividends, to the public budget. Private investors of the regulated firm will share the 
benefits with the government and thus be willing to value positively its presence as shareholder in 
firms. This “corporatist” equilibrium is likely to exist when regulatory powers are imperfectly 
delegated to the formally, and not genuinely IRAs, i.e. in the regime that we refer to as reluctant 
regulation.9 
Following this argument, the relevant research question becomes: under what conditions 
does state ownership have a positive impact on firm value? Our working hypothesis is that this will 
occur where reluctant regulation is more likely, i.e. where the institutional constraints on 
administrative discretion are weaker. To test this hypothesis, we exploit features of the political 
system that proxy the extent to which the executive’s powers are constrained by formal institutional 
arrangements, and we predict that in those countries where such constraints are in place, regulators 
will be less subject to political interference and state ownership will not matter for valuation.10  
The recent political economy literature has developed a vast array of variables capturing 
formal institutional arrangements that curb executive discretion or make policy reversal less likely 
(see, among others, Acemoglu, 2005; Persson and Tabellini; 1999; Persson, 2002). As highlighted 
by Levy and Spiller (1994), the credibility of regulation and the risk of political interference depend 
on the structure and organization of political institutions, such as an effective “checks and balances” 
system. Another important institutional feature is an electoral system, which leads to party 
proliferation and political fragmentation: proportional electoral systems make policy changes less 
                                                 
9 Under imperfect delegation of powers to the IRA, the politician may also extract the rent from the regulated firm 
through bribes. In this case, the politician would not have incentives to retain stakes in the firm. We would thus expect 
to see full privatization cum reluctant regulation where corruption is more widespread (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
However, this alternative equilibrium is less likely to occur in developed economies such as the European countries for 
which this theoretical framework is designed.  
10 Alternative explanations could be set forth to explain why the firm value should be higher at state-controlled firms, 
such as that they are for some reason more efficient, more R&D oriented, better managed than privately-controlled 
firms. But, then, political institutions should not matter at all. 
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likely, thus enhancing the credibility of regulatory commitments; in contrast, majoritarian systems, 
characterized by the turnover of strong governments of different stripes, expose regulation to the 
risk of unexpected policy changes.   
3.2 Empirical Modeling  
The central empirical relationship we are interested in is of the following form:  
Yt = f (Government UCRt-1, IRAt-1, Xt-1), 
where Yt is firm value (the firm market-to-book ratio) at time t, GovernmentUCRt-1 is firm 
ownership (the residual ultimate control rights held by the government) at time t-1, IRAt-1 is a 
dummy denoting the presence of an independent regulatory agency (as opposed to executive-branch 
regulators or ministries) at time t-1and X t-1 is a vector of control variables.  
When exploring this relationship empirically, we face a number of issues. First, 
government’s residual ownership is likely to be endogenous because pay-out expectations and 
investment opportunities affect the privatization decision. Second, endogeneity problems affect also 
the IRA dummy, since the government may have an incentive to set up the IRA in sectors where 
profitability is expected to be higher. Moreover, the IRA dummy is an imperfect measure of 
regulatory independence because it just denotes the presence of a regulatory authority. Third, as 
long as reluctant regulation matters only when the government retains significant ownership rights 
in regulated firms, we must consider the interaction between the ownership variable and the IRA 
dummy, treating the resulting term also as potentially endogenous. Identification is thus a serious 
issue that we will be discussed below.  
Our empirical strategy is the following: to estimate the impact of residual state ownership on 
regulated firms’ market value we first run OLS regressions where we enter the ownership variable 
both linearly and interactively with the IRA dummy. Second, we investigate whether the estimated 
coefficients of our variable of interest – the interaction between state ownership and IRA - differ in 
sub-samples characterized by institutional arrangements with lower or higher ability to constrain 
executive discretion. Third, we try to establish the channel linking regulated firms’ value to residual 
ownership by running a test of over-identifiying restrictions that we describe below. 
 
 
 10
3.3 Identification and Instrumental Variables 
Under a regime of reluctant regulation, government’s power to interfere with regulatory 
policy will produce economic rents that will boost the market value of partially privatized firms. 
The credibility of regulatory commitment hinges therefore upon the ability of the political system to 
constrain administrative discretion.  
Our identification strategy rests on the assumption that political institutions affect the 
latitude of government’s residual regulatory powers and the size of the stake retained in public 
utilities. This qualifies political institutions as potentially valid instruments and, because a set of 
different variables is available, we estimate an over-identified model. By testing that our 
instruments do not have a direct impact on firm value beyond the effect they exert on the 
endogenous variables (see, for example, Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2007; and Tabellini 2010), 
we can isolate the channel through which political institutions affect market value. 
To find suitable instruments, we rely on political economy variables identified by the 
literature on the credibility of regulatory commitments. For example, the number of decision 
makers whose agreement is necessary before policies can be changed is a key feature of any 
political system. Therefore, our first political economy variable, and instrument, is Checks & 
Balances, a time-varying measure of the number of veto players in a political system, adjusting for 
whether these veto players are independent of each other. The index also records whether the same 
or different parties control the executive branch and the legislature in presidential systems, or 
whether there is a minority government or a coalition of one, or more parties controlling the 
government, in proportional systems (Beck et al. 2001, pp. 169-170). It ranges from 0 to 7 to 
measure low vs. high degree and quality of the checks and balances and is sourced from the World 
Bank DPI-Database on Political Institutions.11  
The second political variable, complementary to checks and balances, accounts for the type 
of electoral system, whether it leads to party proliferation or aggregation within the Parliamentary 
system. We use the Electoral Disproportionality index, developed by Gallagher (1991) and updated 
by Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008) according to the following formula: 
  
 
where vi is the share of votes obtained by party in general elections, si is the seat share of the party i, 
and N is the total number of parties in the legislature. The index is continuous and time varying; it 
                                                 
11 This measure has been widely used in the literature (see, for example, Keefer and Knack, 2007). 
( )∑= −= Ni isivG 1 221
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equals zero when there is perfect proportionality between seats and votes and it increases, on 
average, as the electoral rule moves towards the majoritarian system. By locating country-years in a 
political spectrum ranging from the majoritarian and the so-called “consensus” model of 
democracy, the index is a measure of political fragmentation. A lower electoral disproportionality is 
usually associated with a higher effective number of parties in legislature and government and more 
stable executives (Lijphart, 1999).   
The instrument set then includes country-specific variables that help explaining the pace of 
privatization and liberalization reforms. The Political Orientation Index measures government’s 
political preferences in the right-left political spectrum. As shown by Bortolotti and Faccio (2009), 
Potrafke (2010) and Duso and Seldeslachts (2010), the political orientation of the executive in 
charge is a significant determinant of structural reforms such as market liberalization and firm 
privatization.  The index we use ranges from 0 (extreme left wing) to 10 (extreme right wing) and is 
the weighted average of the right-left political orientation scores of the parties forming the 
executive branch of government, where the weights are equal to the number of parliamentary seats 
held by each party divided by the total number of parliamentary seats held by the ruling coalition as 
a whole (see Huber and Inglehart, 1995, updated by Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008). The Debt to GDP 
ratio is the ratio of total government debt (domestic and foreign) to GDP in a given year (our source 
here is the OECD Structural Analysis Database). Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) include this ratio to 
control for one country’s fiscal conditions, as large debt to GDP ratios spurred the privatization 
wave in many EU member states struggling to comply with the requirements of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Finally, to account for changes in the market structure  within public utility sectors, we use 
the OECD Index of Liberalization, sourced from the OECD International Regulation database by 
Conway and Nicoletti (2006). The index is an average of several indicators varying from 0 to 6 
(larger numbers indicate a lower degree of openness) and accounts for entry barriers, vertical 
integration and other features of the industry structure. Because the original index also includes a 
sub-indicator for state ownership of the relevant firms, we excluded this component and recomputed 
the average over the remaining OECD sub-indicators.  
 4. The Sample and the Data 
For the empirical analysis we use an unbalanced panel of 88 publicly traded utilities and 
transportation infrastructure operators from EU 15 member states, tracked from 1994 to 2005.  All 
firms operate in regulated sectors, i.e. where entry and prices are subject to regulatory oversight 
either by the State through ministries, governmental committees, or local governments or by a 
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formally Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA), and many, though publicly traded on a stock 
exchange, are partially owned by the government. The regulated sectors include electric and natural 
gas utilities (in both distribution and transmission), water supply companies, fixed telecoms, freight 
roads concessionaires, and transport infrastructure operators such as ports, airports authorities, and 
rail infrastructure.  
The data comprise a diversified set of firms operating in a wide array of industries that either 
were always under an IRA (such as UK energy, telecom and water companies), or never were 
subject to an IRA (freight roads concessionaries, ports and docks, airports and water companies in 
all Europe except UK), or that become regulated by an IRA within the sample period. Although in 
the empirical analysis we control for this heterogeneity by including firm fixed effects, one might 
worry that the different institutional and regulatory environment faced by the firms (Independent 
Authority, national ministries, local governments or some executive branch commission) might 
somehow bias our results. To address this concern, we conduct the econometric analysis both on the 
larger, more heterogeneous sample and on the sub-sample of energy (electricity and gas) utilities 
and telecom companies EU telecoms and energy (electricity and gas) utilities eventually subject to 
IRA and to similar EU-prompted market reforms. This sub-sample comprises 57 firms - 15 fixed 
telecom operators and 42 energy companies. 
To measure regulatory independence, we use a dummy that is equal to 1 in all years in 
which the firm was subject to an IRA and equals 0 otherwise (i.e. when it is regulated by an 
executive-branch commission). The IRA dummy was constructed using data and information on 
IRAs’ inception dates taken from Gilardi (2005) for energy and telecommunications. As shown in 
Table 1, the U.K. introduced an IRA in 1984 in the telecom industry and in 1989 in the energy 
sector, while most countries established an IRA only in mid nineties, most of them in the time span 
between 1995 and 2000. We complemented this data by drawing information about the presence of 
IRAs in the other sectors from additional sources and found that only the water industry in the UK 
has an independent regulatory agency. Overall, 60 firms (the 57 energy and telecom operators plus 
three UK water supply companies) are (or become) subject to an IRA while 28 are regulated by a 
governmental committee or a ministry.   
For all firms, we identify and track overtime the state’s ultimate control rights (Government 
UCR) following to the weakest link approach. According to this approach, the UCR of the state is 
simply equal to the minimum ownership stake along a chain (i.e., the weakest link). In the case of 
multiple chains, the UCR’s are summed up across all chains.12 Among the 88 firms, 42 firms are 
                                                 
12 The “weakest link” is widely used in the literature to measure control rights. See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), and Bortolotti and Faccio (2009).  
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privately-controlled throughout our sample period, 26 are state-controlled throughout our sample 
period, and 20 were “privatized” during our sample period (i.e. when the state’s ultimate control 
rights fall below 30% during our sample period). As Figure 2 shows, privatized utilities often 
display complex ownership structures, with pyramiding often used to separate share ownership and 
control. A first examination of our data reveals that the State has a stake in sixty-two companies and 
that thirty-seven of the partially State-controlled utilities are subject to an IRA. In Table 2, we 
report, for the ten largest utilities in the telecom and energy sectors, the year since when they 
operate under an IRA, the date of the IPO, the total market capitalization and the Government UCR 
at the end of the sample period (2005). Compared to telecommunications, energy IRAs were 
introduced later, mostly around 2000. The privatization process also differs across countries: it lags 
behind in France and Germany, but is more advanced in Spain and in the U.K. where most sample 
firms are under private control during the sample period.  More in detail, we note that 4 out of 14 
fixed telecom operators were fully privatized by 2005 whereas two, in Germany and Sweden, were 
still controlled by the State with a stake larger than 50%. Among energy operators, the UK 
companies are fully privatized, E.ON (Germany) and Iberdola (Spain) have government UCR 
below 5%, while the two France operators are still owned by the state with a share larger than 80% 
(as of 2005).  
Accounting and financial firm-level data have been collected from Worldscope. As a 
measure of firm value, we use the market-to-book ratio (MTB). MTB is calculated as total assets 
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the total assets. The 
market value of equity is computed by multiplying the number of outstanding shares at the end of 
the relevant year by the share price at that date converted into U.S. dollars. Other key variables for 
the analysis of market-to-book ratios are the log of real total assets to control for size, the ratio of 
EBIT (earnings before interests and taxes) to total assets, which is a proxy for profitability and 
“efficiency”, and firm financial leverage, defined as total financial debt divided by the sum of book 
equity and total financial debt.  
We also control for key features of the financial and macroeconomic environment of the 
different EU countries. We use the Investor Protection index, i.e. the “anti-director rights” index 
developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) and updated by Pagano and 
Volpin (2005) to proxy for the extent of protection and enforcement of investor rights. The index is 
time varying and goes from 0 to 7 as shareholders’ rights become more protected. We expect that 
higher values of this index are associated with lower cost of equity and hence higher market value 
(see, for example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002). Finally, we include GDP 
Growth to account for country specific differences in macroeconomic conditions over time. Table 3 
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summarizes the descriptive statistics for the main firm and country level variables used in the 
analysis both for the full sample (Panel A) and for the sub-sample of energy and telecom companies 
(Panel B). 
Figure 1 shows the average market-to-book ratios for private and state controlled firms from 
3 years before the IRA set up to 3 years after the IRA establishment, using the 57 energy and 
telecom firms. If we define as state-controlled those companies where Government UCR are equal 
to or greater than 30%, we notice that the average market to book ratio of state controlled firms is 
lower before the switch (year 0), but thereafter starts growing and, in the second and third year after 
the IRA setup, is definitively larger: +20% and + 15%, respectively. In contrast, the average MTB 
of private companies decreased from 1.33, at the regime switch, to 1.22 three years later.  
5.  The Effect of State Ownership on the Market Value of Regulated Firms 
We estimate the following regression: 
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where MTBit is the Market-to-Book ratio of firm i in year t, GovernmentUCRi,t-1 and IRAi,t-1 are the 
lagged values of the continuous government ultimate control rights variable and of the IRA dummy, 
GovernmentUCRi,t-1 *IRAi,t-1 is the interaction term that allows us to test for the effect of residual 
State ownership when the IRA is in place,13 Xit-1 is a vector of firm-specific variables, Yit is a vector 
of country-specific variables, μi and λt are firm and year fixed effects while εit is an error term. The 
vector of firm controls in this regression includes the Log of Real Total Assets to control for size, 
the EBIT-to-Total Assets ratio to control for profitability/efficiency and the financial Leverage, 
defined as total financial debt divided by the sum of book equity and total financial debt.14  The 
vector of country-specific controls includes GDP growth and the Investor Protection index. To 
                                                 
13 A similar approach was used by Kwoka (2002 and 2006) to assess the differences across private and public 
ownership in the prices charged by U.S. electric utilities and in their cost efficiency. 
14 This specification is rather standard in the literature (see, for example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; McConnell 
and Servaes, 1990; Lang, Ofek and Stulz, 1996). The reason for not using market leverage is to avoid the spurious 
correlation resulting from the fact that the market value of equity appears both in the numerator of Market-to-Book and 
in the denominator of market leverage.  
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partly address potential reverse causality, we lag all firm variables one year and moreover we add 
firm-specific fixed effects to filter out unobserved firm heterogeneity that is constant over time. 
In Table 4, we present the O.L.S. fixed effect coefficients for the EU regulated utilities 
(columns (1) and (2)) and for the sub-sample of 57 regulated energy and telecom firms that, 
following the EC directives, at some point in time - mostly from 1996 to 2000 - implemented the 
new regulatory regime. In Columns (3) and (4), we thus focus on the changes in the market value of 
private vs. public firms after they became subject to an IRA.  
The results show that the market to book ratio is negatively related to firm size and that 
market value is larger in countries where investor rights are better protected by the law and GDP 
growth is faster. In Column (1), we find that neither state ownership nor the IRA dummy has, 
separately, a significant effect. Column (2) adds the interaction between Government UCR and IRA.  
We find that the coefficient on Government UCR turns significantly negative, while its interaction 
with IRA is positive and highly significant. The positive coefficient on the interacted terms suggests 
that when the IRA is in place, the larger the share held by the State, the higher the firm market 
value. In Columns (3) and (4), the results for the control variables are less precisely estimated, 
probably due to the exclusion of firms that either had the IRA from the start or never became 
subject to an IRA, which sort of reduced the heterogeneity in the data. Notwithstanding this, in 
Column (3) we find that the coefficient on GovernmentUCR is positive and significant and, in 
Column (4), when we consider the effect of public ownership under the IRA, the standalone 
GovernmentUCR variable is no longer significant while the interaction term is positive and 
significant. This latter result is consistent with the graphical evidence in Figure 1.  
In the next section, we interpret this finding, analyzing its political economy implications. 
For this analysis, we focus on the sub-sample of firms operating in the energy and telecom  sectors 
where IRAs have been established. We report the results for the full sample in the Appendix.  
6. Firm Value and State Ownership: the Role of Political Institutions  
Our next step is to examine the driving forces that may explain the positive impact of 
residual state ownership on firm value when the IRA exists.  In Section 3, we argued that the quality 
of a country’s political institutions disciplines the discretionary power of the government and its 
latitude to interfere with the regulatory policy. To implement an empirical test we first investigate 
whether the response of firm value to different regulatory and ownership regimes differs across 
“weak” vs. “strong” political institutions as measured by two country-specific indices: Checks and 
Balances and Electoral Disproportionality (Section 6.1). We then address the potential endogeneity 
 16
of Government UCR, IRA and of their interaction by incorporating the role of political institutions 
straight into a specific identifying assumption, i.e. that Checks and Balances and Disproportionality 
are valid instruments in a regression of partially privatized regulated firms’ market-to-book ratio 
(Section 6.2). 
6.1 Weak vs. Strong Political Institutions: Evidence from Sub-samples 
We estimate market value regressions where we split our sample energy and telecom firms 
based on Checks and Balances (C&B) in Table 5, and Electoral Disproportionality in Table 6. The 
indexes allow for institutional changes over time as well as firms shifting across the “high”-“low” 
categories.  To classify country-years observations with the strongest countervailing powers, we 
refer to values of the C&B index at the top quartile of its distribution – more specifically, when 
C&B is greater than 4 (and symmetrically, for observations with C&B less than or equal to 4). 
Based on country averages, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Germany exhibit the highest scoresand 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy the lowest. Figure 3 reports the trends of the political institutions 
indexes for two selected countries at the top and at the bottom ends of the distributions, i.e. 
Denmark and Germany, Spain and Italy, respectively.   
The empirical results in Table 5 are consistent with our predictions.  In countries where 
institutional checks and balances are weaker, larger government’s ownership stakes lead to higher 
MTB ratios for the regulated firms. The evidence is weaker in Column (1) where we do not account 
for the presence of the IRA, but is very strong where we do, in Column (2). The results strikingly 
differ when we turn to Columns (3) and (4), where the countervailing powers are supposed to 
restrain interference from the executive more efficiently. In both specifications, the IRA dummy is 
positive and significant which suggests that where IRAs are expected to act independently (as 
envisioned by the EC directives), capital markets assign a premium to the reduced regulatory 
uncertainty that follows regulatory commitment (see Cambini and Rondi, 2011, for evidence on 
fixed investment). Moreover, in Column (4), the interaction between GovernmentUCR and the IRA 
dummy is negatively correlated with firm value, and this is consistent with the typical negative 
outlook assigned to state-controlled regulated utilities.  
To classify country-years observations where policy reversals are supposed to be less likely  
owing to the electoral system, we refer to low values of the Electoral Disproportionality index. 
Recall that low values of the index indicate highly fragmented political systems and divided 
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governments, which according to Levy and Spiller (1994)15, favor regulatory commitment while, 
incontrast, more cohesive governments typical of majoritarian systems have more room to interfere 
in regulatory decisions. Indeed, we notice that, on average, Electoral Disproportionality is 
negatively correlated with C&Bs, suggesting that checks and balances tend to be less effective in 
majoritarian systems. Again using country averages, we find that Denmark, Holland, Germany and 
Sweden score lower Disproportionality Indexes, while, at the opposite end of the distribution, 
France (the most majoritarian system), the UK, Greece and Italy score the higher indexes. In Figure 
3, we plot the evolution of both Checks and Balances and Disproportionality for a subset of 
countries.  
In Table 6, we report the results of the MTB equation when the sample is split according to 
the electoral rule.  To allow straightforward comparability with the results in Table 5, we inverted 
the Disproportionality index to generate an Electoral Proportionality (EP) index so that high 
proportionality has, by construction, an effect similar to high checks and balances. To separate the 
sample, we thus use a threshold value of Electoral Proportionality of 28.5 to split the sample (i.e. 
the 75th percentile value of the distribution of the inverted Disproportionality index). The results in 
Table 6 show that, as the electoral rule becomes less proportional (hence in countries with more 
majoritarian parliamentary systems), the larger the stake held by the state, the higher the firm 
market value, particularly if the IRA is in place as shown by the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on the GovernmentUCR*IRA interaction in Column (2). In contrast, when we focus on 
the sub-sample with more fragmented parliamentary systems, residual state ownership of regulated 
firms is irrelevant (see Columns (3) and (4)).  
Our results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the exploitation of political leverage to obtain 
higher value (through political interference in regulatory decisions) does not occur whenever 
regulation is granted independence by countervailing powers constraining the power of the 
executive. In this case, regulatory policy is enforced independently of government residual stakes in 
firms.16  
 
 
                                                 
15 Spiller and Urbiztondo (1994) also show that the probability of observing more independent agencies is higher in 
systems characterized by divided governments. 
16 In the Appendix, we apply the same sub-sampling strategy to the full sample (i.e. including also firms in utility 
sectors regulated not by an independent authority, but by a branch of the government such as ministries or governmental 
committees). We find that the results are very similar: under low checks and balances systems and less fragmented party 
systems, a larger governments stake leads to higher firm value.   
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6.2 Instrumental variable results 
The results reported in the previous section support the idea of reluctant regulation as a 
possible factor explaining why state ownership benefits public utilities. We now try to find more 
systematic evidence from instrumental variable estimation. In Section 3 we argued that state 
ownership could affect its market value only when weak political institutions allow government’s 
interference through reluctant regulation.  To test this prediction, we now estimate the effect of 
political institutions by two-stage least squares (2SLS), using Checks and Balances, or Electoral 
Proportionality, and other country-specific variables (political orientation, the debt to GDP ratio, 
and market openness) as instruments for Government UCR, IRA and their interaction (Government 
UCR*IRA).  Because we have more instruments than endogenous variables, our statistical model is 
over-identified. We thus test the over-identifying restrictions and identify the impact of both state 
ownership and IRA on firm value by testing the exclusion restriction that Checks and Balances and 
Electoral Proportionality do not appear in the second stage estimation of firm market value, MTB 
(we perform a similar test also for the other instruments).  
In Table 7.1, we present the first-stage regressions for Government UCR, IRA and their 
interaction when we use Checks and Balances (Columns (1), (3) and (5)) and Electoral 
Proportionality (Columns (2), (4) and (6)) in the instrument sets. In Columns (1) and (2), the 
negative coefficients on Political Orientation indicate that state ownership tends to be lower when 
the executive is more ”right-wing”, while the positive coefficients on the OECD index suggest that 
larger government stakes tend to be associated with less open and less liberalized markets. Columns 
(3) and (4) suggest that IRAs were primarily set up when the Debt-to-GDP ratio is highest, probably 
because EU member states tend to be more eager to comply with institutional requirements when 
they are under fiscal distress. In addition, the inception of an IRA is positively associated with right-
wing governments, market openness, and electoral proportionality, and negatively related to checks 
and balances (but recall that the IRAs were setup following EU Directives, so these results may 
reflect the timing of the implementation of the norm). More importantly for our point of view, 
Columns (5) and (6) show that, when the IRA is in place, residual state ownership tend to be larger 
where the institutional checks and balances are weaker and electoral proportionality is lower. This 
evidence is consistent with the idea that strong, less accountable executives do not wish to 
relinquish control over politically sensitive public utilities from which they can extract economic 
rents.  Overall the first-stage results deliver an important message: of all the instruments we used, 
only Checks and Balances and Electoral Proportionality are significant determinants of all the 
endogenous variables. More to the point, they are the only significant explanatory variables of the 
interaction term that capture the residual state ownership under the IRA (Columns (5) and (6)).  
 19
In Table 7.2, we present the 2SLS results where we test the over-identifying restrictions by 
calculating the Sargan-Hansen and the Difference in Sargan statistics as well as by including C&B 
and EP directly in the second-stage regressions.  
Columns (1) and (3) report the 2SLS estimates when we use, respectively, C&B and EP in 
the instrument set, along with political orientation, debt to GDP ratio and the OECD market 
liberalization index. The results show that the interaction Government UCR*IRA is positive and 
significant in all columns, which supports our hypothesis that the presence of the government as a 
(residual) shareholder boosts the regulated firm’s value providing a sort of indirect governmental 
protection that is apparently recognized and rewarded by the capital markets.   
Comfortingly, the J statistics shows that the sets of instruments we use in both specifications 
are valid and the Difference in Sargan tests on the political institution variables confirm that they 
are valid instruments.  However, we further test the exclusion restrictions by entering C&B and EP 
in the second stage, in Columns (2) and (4) respectively. The results confirm the validity of our 
identification strategy, as both instruments, once included in the MTB regression, are statistically 
insignificant.17 This analysis shows that (weak) political institutions affect firms’ market value, but 
only through the effect of residual government stakes in regulated firms. We set forth reluctant 
regulation as an important channel to explain the valuation effect of government’s shareholdings in 
public utilities.  
7. Robustness Tests  
As noted in Section 2, from a country level perspective, the UK is the EU member state 
where the institutional reforms started earlier. More precisely, independent regulators in 
telecommunications, energy and water supply were set up in the Eighties and most firms were fully 
privatized even before. The peculiarity and relevance of the UK suggest us to check the robustness 
of our results on a sample that excludes UK firms. In Table 8 we re-estimate the model with the 
interaction between Government UCR and IRA for the full sample of non-UK firms as well as for 
the sub-samples with low C&B and Electoral Proportionality.  Comfortingly, the results support 
our predictions and are very similar to those reported in Tables 5-7 and even sharper. In columns (1) 
and (2), both the OLS and the 2SLS estimated coefficients on the Government UCR*IRA interacted 
variable are positive and highly significant. Moreover, the positive coefficients are significant and 
larger in the market value regressions for the firm-year observations subject to weaker checks and 
balances and less proportional party systems. This analysis confirms that our results were not 
                                                 
17 We perform similar tests on the other instruments, by including them, one at the time, in the second stage regressions. 
We found that none of them were statistically significant. Results are available upon request.   
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sensitive to the presence (or the absence) of a country, such as the UK where privatization and 
liberalization reforms date back to the Eighties.  
In the second robustness check, we replace the continuous ownership variable with a 
dummy to control whether the results hold for regulated firms where the state maintains a stake 
large enough to reasonably ensure relative power and discretionality in managerial decisions. So we 
use a plausible threshold of state ownership, i.e. a dummy that equals 1 when the Government UCR 
are equal to and greater than 30%, to account for the fact that the state as a shareholder is likely to 
exercise control even when it holds less than the majority interest. Table 9 reports the results from 
estimating the specification with the interaction between the IRA dummy and the ownership 
dummy UCR_30%. We find that the presence of the state as a shareholder with (at least) a 30% 
stake positively and significantly affects the market value, but only when we control for the 
endogeneity ownership variable and its interaction with the IRA dummy (Column (2)). The positive 
effect, however, becomes strongly significant when we turn to the sub-sample of observations in 
countries with low checks and balances (in Column (3)) and less proportional electoral rules hence 
more majoritarian government systems (in Column (4)). Consistently with our theoretical 
framework, in such political environments governments maintain the latitude to interfere with 
regulatory decisions, and politicians may find it convenient to slow down privatizations.  
Finally, it may be argued that our state controlled companies operate in sectors where 
competition is still limited and, therefore, that our results capture part of this market power. 
According to an OECD report by Conway and Nicoletti (2006, p.6), the presence of public 
ownership hinders competition in some sectors: "with public enterprises often enjoying soft budget 
constraints and state guarantees, the playing field is not level in markets where they operate".  We 
thus use the OECD index of product market regulation to test the impact of the intensity of 
competition on firm market value, following the same strategy employed for political institutions. 
We thus first split the sample using a threshold value of OECD Index of Liberalization to estimate the 
effect of government control in industries with high (index below 0.8, i.e. the 25th percentile value 
of the distribution of the index) and low (index above 0.8) competition. The results show that 
Government UCR*IRA is never significant, whether markets are more or less liberalized, both for 
the full sample and for the telecom and energy sub-sample. Second, we check the direct impact of 
competition by introducing the index as a regressor in the IV second-stage regression. We find that 
the OECD Index of Liberalization is insignificant, while Government UCR*IRA remains positive 
 21
and highly significant. In sum, the positive effect of government ownership on regulated firms’ 
market value is not driven by the intensity of market openness and liberalization.18 
8. Conclusions  
Over the last 20 years and around the world, regulatory competencies in network industries 
have been delegated to independent agencies in order to improve market efficiency and to discipline 
the conflict of interest stemming from the dual role of the state as owner and regulator. However, 
despite significant efforts and structural reforms, most utilities, in Europe and elsewhere, are still 
owned and often controlled by the state. Consequently, regulatory independence and residual state 
ownership are intertwined institutional features that affect firm real and financial decisions, and 
ultimately market value. 
In this paper, we study empirically the relationship between state ownership and firms’ 
value when companies are subject to independent regulation. Using a large sample of European 
utilities, we show state ownership is positively associated with firm value and that this effect is 
strong and significant in countries where weak checks and balances and lower political 
fragmentation do not constrain the power of the executive. Hence, where political institutions are 
weak, politicians imperfectly delegate powers to regulatory agencies in order to benefit state-owned 
firms. We label the creation of formally but not de facto independent agencies reluctant regulation, 
a new concept which allows us to explain why governments stakes are associated with higher 
valuations, and why privatization is so often partial and incomplete in network industries.   
Our results point out a possible regulatory failure in industrial organizations dominated by 
state controlled incumbents and characterized by reluctant regulation. Under these circumstances, 
the state apparently enjoys and shares with private shareholders an undue economic rent at the 
expense of consumers. Given the prevalence of state controlled utilities and the strong power 
wielded by national governments, this conclusion raises concerns about the effectiveness of 
privatization and regulatory policies in network industries in Europe. To address the problem and 
therefore to make the recent structural reforms on network industries more credible, national 
governments may push forward privatization to eliminate the potential conflict of interest, or 
improve regulatory institutions in the direction of an enhanced independence and public 
accountability.  
                                                 
18 We do not report the results for reason of space, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
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Figure 1 – Market to book ratios at the IRA inception, before and after the event  
(Sample: firms undergoing the change in regulatory regime; ownership threshold at 30%) 
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Figure 2. The evolution of the government control rights in EU utilities: the case of Telecom Portugal 
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Figure 3 
Political indicators in selected EU countries  
Checks & Balances – source: Beck et al. (2001) - and  
Gallagher Political Institutions Disproportionality Index (source: Gallagher, 1991, and Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008) 
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Table 1 -- Timing of regulation and privatization in the energy and telecommunications sectors in European countries 
 
 Energy (Electricity & Gas) Telecommunications 
   
Country Date of 
establishment of 
IRA 
Liberalization 
Reform in 
Electricity 
(Directive 96/92) 
Liberalization 
Reform in Gas 
(Directive 
98/30) 
Privatization 
revenues in 
energy raised 
before the 
transposition 
Directives 
Privatization 
revenues in 
energy raised 
before the 
establishment 
of the IRA 
Date of 
establishment 
of IRA 
Liberalization 
Reform in 
Telecoms 
(Directive 
90/388) 
Privatization 
revenues in 
TLC raised 
before the 
transposition 
Directives 
Privatization 
revenues in 
TLC raised 
before the 
establishment 
of IRA 
Italy 1995 1999 2000 30.52% 0 1997 1997 5.72% 5.72% 
UK 1989 2000 2000 100% 18.60% 1984 1997 94.84% 3.07% 
Spain 1998 1997 1998 23.91% 52.62% 1996 1997 22.17% 22.17% 
France 2000 2000 2003 2.54% 2.54% 1996 1996 2.24% 2.24% 
Portugal 1995 1999 2006 66.58% 12.94% 2001 1997 31.19% 100% 
Germany 2006 1998 2003 63.15% 100% 1996 1996 0% 0% 
Netherlands 1998 1998 2001 16.11% 0% 1997 1998 42.84% 41.86% 
Austria 2000 1998 2000 55.40% 70.76% 1997 1997 0% 0% 
Sweden 1998 1997 2004 0% 0% 1992 1997 0% 0% 
Finland 1995 1998 - 4.47% 0.42% 1987 1997 0.10% 0% 
Greece 2000 1999 Failure to transpose 2.40% 0% 1992 1999 50.20% 0% 
Belgium 1999 2000 1999 10.12% 10.12% 1991 1997 79.33% 0% 
Ireland 1999 1999 2000 - - 1997 1996 0% 0% 
Denmark 1999 1996 2001 0% 0% 2002 1996 48.54% 100% 
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Table 2 – The top 20 European regulated companies by market capitalization 
 
      
Company Name Country Date of 
Establishment 
of an IRA 
IPO Year Market  
Capitalization 
(US$bn, end 2005) 
Government 
Control Rights 
(end 2005) 
 
Panel A: Telecommunications 
 
Telefonica de Espana SA Spain 1996 1987 71.88 0.000 
Deutsche Telekom AG Germany 1996 1996 69.74 0.575 
France Telecom France 1996 1997 64.58 0.324 
Telecom Italia SpA Italy 1997 1997 56.04 0.000 
British Telecommunications PLC U.K. 1984 1991 33.02 0.000 
Telia Sonera AB Sweden 1992 2000 24.10 0.590 
Koninklijke KPN NV Netherlands 1997 1994 21.32 0.078 
TeleDanmark AS Denmark 2002 1994 11.64 0.000 
Portugal Telecom SA Portugal 2001 1995 11.27 0.127 
Telekom Austria AG Austria 1997 2000 10.83 0.302 
 
Panel B: Energy 
 
Electricité de France France 2000 2005 68.88 0.873 
E.ON Germany 2006 1987 68.14 0.048 
Enel Italy 1995 1999 48.29 0.322 
RWE Germany 2006 1922 41.47 0.310 
Suez France 2000 1987 39.10 0.197 
Vivendi France 2000 2000 36.00 0.124 
British Gas PLC U.K. 1989 1986 35.03 0.000 
Gaz de France France 2000 2005 28.80 0.801 
National Grid Transo PLC U.K. 1989 1995 28.67 0.000 
Iberdola Spain 1998 1992 24.60 0.020 
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Table 3 - Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. Obs. 
      
Market-to-Book 1.389 0.489 0.572 4.351 765 
Book Leverage 0.272 0.215 0 1 763 
Log of Real Total Asset 11.003 1.803 5.694 14.506 765 
EBIT-to-Total Asset  0.074 0.105 -1.948 0.299 755 
Government’s UCR 0.271 0.302 0 1 765 
Independence Regulatory Agency dummy 0.605 0.489 0 1 765 
Investor Protection Index 3.935 1.197 1 5 765 
GDP Growth 2.446 1.372 -1.12 10.72 765 
Checks and balances Index 3.780 0.927 2 7 765 
Political Constraints Index 0.743 0.078 0.363 0.894 765 
Disproportionality Index 10.334 7.830 0.428 33.739 765 
Political Orientation Index 5.762 1.517 3.665 8.025 765 
Public Debt to GDP Ratio 0.673 0.262 0.273 1.243 723 
      
 
Panel B: Sub sample of energy and telecom firms 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. Obs. 
      
Market-to-Book 1.389 0.472 0.572 4.352 493 
Book Leverage 0.311 0.211 0 1 492 
Log of Real Total Asset 11.538 1.551 6.680 14.506 493 
EBIT-to-Total Asset  0.068 0.120 -1.948 0.299 483 
Government’s UCR 0.285 0.285 0 1 493 
Independence Regulatory Agency dummy 0.799 0.401 0 1 493 
Investor Protection Index 3.817 1.163 1 5 493 
GDP Growth 2.417 1.434 -1.12 10.72 493 
Checks and balances Index 3.836 0.937 2 7 493 
Political Constraints Index 0.752 0.071 0.363 0.894 493 
Disproportionality Index 8.943 7.238 0.428 33.739 493 
Political Orientation Index 5.806 1.501 3.665 8.025 493 
Public Debt to GDP Ratio 0.677 0.253 0.273 1.243 469 
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Table 4 – Market value, government ownership and IRA  - OLS estimates 
The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total Assets - Book Value of Equity + Market Value 
of Equity)/Total Assets). Government UCR is a continuous variable constructed by Bortolotti and Faccio (2009), 
which uses the weakest link approach to measure the State’s ultimate control rights. IRA is a dummy equal to 1 if an 
independent regulatory agency (IRA) is in place and is equal to 0 otherwise. Investor Protection is the time-varying 
“antidirector rights” index by Pagano and Volpin (2005). The explanatory variables are defined in Section 4.1. 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. ***, **, * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
Dependent variable: MTB ratio 
 
 Full sample Telecoms and Energy sample 
Leveraget-1  -0.091 -0.083 0.060 0.049 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.261) (0.254) 
EBIT-to-Total Assetst-1 0.218 0.208 0.611 0.581 
 (0.135) (0.131) (0.500) (0.218) 
Log of real total assetst-1  -0.192*** -0.184** -0.317** -0.308** 
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.141) (0.138) 
Investor Protectiont 0.066* 0.057* 0.025 0.004 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.084) (0.072) 
GDP Growtht 0.079** 0.085** -0.001 0.018 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.043) (0.040) 
Government UCRt-1 -0.110 -0.267** 1.190* 0.500 
 (0.158) (0.134) (0.657) (0.414) 
IRAt-1 0.030 -0.067 0.178 -0.131 
 (0.078) (0.093) (0.127) (0.105) 
Government UCRt-1 * IRA - 0.377*** - 0.996** 
 - (0.195) - (0.487) 
     
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R squared 0.255 0.262 0.191 0.202 
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 88 [696] 88 [696] 57 [451] 57 [451] 
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Table 5 –The role of political institutions: checks and balances - OLS estimates 
 
Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total Assets 
- Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory variables are defined similarly to Table 
4. C&B is the Checks & Balances, a time-varying index, ranging from 0 to 7, that measures the number of veto powers in 
the political system according to specific legislative and executive indexes of electoral competitiveness (World Bank 
Database on Political Institutions). Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group 
serial correlation. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 Checks and Balances 
Dependent variable: MTB ratio 
 
(1) 
Low C&B 
(2) 
Low C&B 
(3) 
High C&B 
(4) 
High C&B 
Leveraget-1  -0.211 -0.232 0.055 0.063 
 (0.146) (0.145) (0.200) (0.169) 
EBIT-to-Total Assetst-1 0.201 0.184 -0.692 -1.188 
 (0.147) (0.131) (0.874) (0.942) 
Log of real total assetst-1  -0.196** -0.207** -0.107 -0.174 
 (0.089) (0.085) (0.226) (0.212) 
Investor Protectiont -0.015 -0.029 0.004 0.025 
 (0.049) (0.042) (0.182) (0.189) 
GDP Growtht -0.011 -0.008 0.056 -0.003 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.090) (0.086) 
Government UCRt-1 0.232 -0.294 -0.812 -0.813 
 (0.190) (0.230) (0.671) (0.555) 
IRAt-1 0.060 -0.147 0.508** 1.080*** 
 (0.110) (0.140) (0.232) (0.398) 
Government UCRt-1 * IRA - 0.726*** - -1.443*** 
 - (0.250) - (0.549) 
     
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R squared 0.308 0.326 0.486 0.518 
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 50 [353] 50 [353] 22 [93] 22 [93] 
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Table 6 – The role of political institutions: electoral system - OLS estimates 
 
Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total Assets 
- Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory variables are defined similarly to Table 
4. The Proportionality Index by Gallagher (1991), updated by Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008) is a continuous and time 
varying index of parliamentary fragmentation. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within 
group serial correlation. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 
 Degree of electoral  proportionality 
Dependent variable: MTB ratio 
 
(1) 
Low 
proportionality 
 
(2) 
Low 
proportionality 
 
(3) 
High 
proportionality 
 
(4) 
High 
proportionality 
 
Leveraget-1  -0.291** -0.323** 0.275 0.249 
 (0.144) (0.142) (0.291) (0.312) 
EBIT-to-Total Assetst-1 0.155 0.147 -0.772 -0.815* 
 (0.154) (0.140) (0.523) (0.493) 
Log of real total assetst-1  -0.208** -0.227** -0.503*** -0.483*** 
 (0.104) (0.098) (0.174) (0.184) 
Investor Protectiont -0.011 -0.033 0.280* 0.2711 
 (0.052) (0.048) (0.161) (0.171) 
GDP Growtht -0.002 0.013 0.050 0.052 
 (0.062) (0.059) (0.081) (0.077) 
Government UCRt-1 0.257 -0.374 -0.390 -0.538 
 (0.185) (0.308) (0.487) (0.395) 
IRAt-1 0.099 -0.080 0.122 0.017 
 (0.099) (0.114) (0.167) (0.267) 
Government UCRt-1 * IRA - 0.942*** - 0.230 
 - (0.344) - (0.326) 
     
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R squared 0.364 0.381 0.451 0.454 
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 38 [271] 38 [271] 26 [177] 26 [177] 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 P value = 0.112 
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Table 7.1 - Market to book and the role of political and institutional variables:  
First stage analysis 
 
Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. Political orientation, Debt to GDP, and OECD Index of Liberalization 
are defined in Section 4. Checks & Balances and Proportionality Index are defined in Tables 5 and 6 respectively and 
in Section 3. Firm and year dummies included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
Government 
UCRt 
Government 
UCRt 
IRAt IRAt 
Government 
UCRt* IRA
Government 
UCRt* IRA Dependent variable:  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Political Orientation t-1 -0.014** -0.004 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.000 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) 
Debt/GDP t-1 0.138 -0.110 0.582 0.706** 0.280 0.064 
 (0.180) (0.173) (0.365) (0.359) (0.214) (0.216) 
OECD Index of Liberalization t-1 0.021** 0.014 -0.032 -0.038** -0.005 -0.012 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) 
Checks & Balances t-1 -0.034* - -0.063** - -0.037* - 
 (0.019) - (0.028) - (0.020) - 
Proportionality Index t-1 - -0.038*** - 0.032* - -0.032*** 
 - (0.008) - (0.017) - (0.008) 
       
Additional instruments: Leverage, EBIT-Total Assets, Log Tot Assets, Investor protection, GDP growth 
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 57 [424] 57 [424] 57 [424] 57 [424] 57 [424] 57 [424] 
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Table 7.2 - Market to book and the role of political and institutional variables:  
Second stage results and test of the exclusion restrictions 
Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. 2SLS estimates. The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined 
as (Total Assets - Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory variables are defined 
similarly to Table 4. C&B is the Checks & Balances, a time-varying index, ranging from 0 to 7, that measures the number 
of veto powers in the political system according to specific legislative and executive indexes of electoral competitiveness 
(World Bank Database on Political Institutions). The Proportionality Index by Gallagher (1991), updated by Bortolotti and 
Pinotti (2008) is a continuous and time varying index of parliamentary fragmentation. Checks & Balances is included as 
instrument in Col. 1 and as regressor in Col. 2. Proportionality Index is included as instrument in Col. 3 and as regressor in 
Col. 4. The Hansen J statistic tests the null of the validity of all instruments, the C statistics is the difference-in-Sargan test 
that suspect regressors or instruments are exogenous. Firm and year dummies included. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
MTBt MTBt MTBt MTBt Dependent variable:  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Leveraget-1  -0.193 -0.212 -0.263** -0.220 
 (0.143) (0.140) (0.133) (0.163) 
EBIT-to-Total Assetst-1 0.112 0.126 0.178 0.151 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109) 
Log of real total assetst-1  -0.156** -0.170** -0.226*** -0.195** 
 (0.066) (0.080) (0.066) (0.104) 
Investor Protectiont -0.032 -0.021 -0.043 -0.064 
 (0.067) (0.069) (0.058) (0.062) 
GDP Growtht 0.081* 0.083* 0.085* 0.075 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.065) 
Government UCRt-1 0.154 -0.424 -2.178 -1.102 
 (1.508) (2.058) (1.721) (3.228) 
IRAt-1 -0.584 -0.788 -1.130* -1.007 
 (0.437) (0.645) (0.609) (0.688) 
Government UCRt-1 * IRA 2.125** 2.280** 2.438** 2.525** 
 (0.877) (1.039) (1.212) (1.051) 
Checks & Balances t-1 - -0.038 - - 
 - (0.105) - - 
Proportionality Index t-1 - - - 0.043 
 - - - (0.091) 
     
Instrumented Variables: Government UCRt-1*IRA, IRAt-1, Government UCRt-1 
Hansen J (all instruments) (p value) 0.940 0.996 0.655 0.427 
Diff-in-Sargan C test:  
C&B Index / Prop. Index (p value) 
 
0.726 
 
0.990 
 
0.358 
 
0.426 
     
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 57 [424] 57 [424] 57 [424] 57 [424] 
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Table 8 –Robustness: market value, ownership and IRA excluding UK firms 
 
Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total 
Assets - Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory variables are defined 
similarly to Table 4. C&B (Checks & Balances), the Political Constraints and the Disproportionality Indexes are 
defined as in Table 6. The Hansen J statistic tests the null of the validity of all instruments, the C statistics is the 
difference-in-Sargan test that suspect regressors or instruments are exogenous.  Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation.  ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%. 
 
Dependent variable: MTB ratio 
 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
I.V. 
(3) 
Low C&B 
OLS 
(4) 
Low 
Proportionality 
OLS 
Leveraget-1  -0.077 -0.106 -0.125 -0295 
 (0.179) (0.169) (0.191) (0.268) 
EBIT-to-Total Assetst-1 0.029 -0.179 0.337 0.991 
 (0.468) (0.555) (0.392) (1.013) 
Log of real total assetst-1  -0.204** -0.213* -0.119** -0.088** 
 (0.105) (0.112) (0.058) (0.044) 
Investor Protectiont 0.054 0.021 0.010 0.015 
 (0.044) (0.050) (0.033) (0.056) 
GDP Growtht 0.066 0.109** 0.010 0.031 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.032) (0.068) 
IRAt-1 0.075 -0.552 -0.114 0.059 
 (0.114) (0.433) (0.129) (0.131) 
Government UCRt-1 -0.281 -1.993 -0.334* -0.295 
 (0.213) (1.906) (0.206) (0.345) 
Government UCRt-1 * IRA 0.271* 1.924* 0.673*** 0.671* 
 (0.162) (1.146) (0.198) (0.388) 
     
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R squared 0.307 - 0.278 0.394 
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
Hansen J (all instruments) (p value) - 0.560 - - 
Diff-in-Sargan: Prop. Index (p value)  - 0.247 - - 
     
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 45 [341] 45 [324] 38 [245] 26 [163] 
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Table 9 – Market value, IRA and government UCR at 30% threshold 
Sample of energy and telecom regulated firms. The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total 
Assets - Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory variables are defined similarly 
to Table 4. UCR30% is a dummy equal to 1 when the government controls 30% or more of the firm’s UCR and is equal 
to 0 otherwise. The Hansen J statistic tests the null of the validity of all instruments, the C statistics is the difference-in-
Sargan test that suspect regressors or instruments are exogenous.  Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 
Dependent variable: MTB ratio 
 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
Low C&B 
OLS 
(4) 
Low 
proportionality 
OLS 
Leveraget-1  -0.199 -0.219* -0.223 -0.323** 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.143) (0.144) 
EBIT-to-Total Assetst-1 0.190 0.166 0.188 0.146 
 (0.127) (0.100) (0.134) (0.143) 
Log of real total assetst-1  -0.240*** -0.216*** -0.207** -0.232** 
 (0.091) (0.059) (0.088) (0.100) 
Investor Protectiont 0.005 -0.050 -0.026 -0.034 
 (0.039) (0.060) (0.041) (0.047) 
GDP Growtht 0.045 0.099* -0.011 -0.005 
 (0.041) (0.051) (0.032) (0.061) 
IRAt-1 0.006 -0.885* -0.081 0.014 
 (0.111) (0.519) (0.157) (0.123) 
UCR 30% t-1 -0.087 -1.321 -0.152 -0.202 
 (0.117) (1.047) (0.189) (0.149) 
UCR 30% t-1 * IRA 0.046 1.633** 0.360** 0.421*** 
 (0.136) (0.810) (0.166) (0.160) 
     
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R squared 0. 309 - 0.311 0.364 
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
Hansen J (all instruments) (p value) - 0.437 - - 
Diff-in-Sargan: Prop. Index (p value) - 0.301 - - 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 57 [449] 57 [424] 50 [353] 38 [271] 
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Appendix - Market value and ownership: the role of political institutions  
Full sample 
 
The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total Assets - Book Value of Equity + Market Value of 
Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory variables are defined similarly to Table 4. C&B is the Checks & Balances, a time-
varying index, ranging from 0 to 7, that measures the number of veto powers in the political system according to specific 
legislative and executive indexes of electoral competitiveness (World Bank Database on Political Institutions). Standard 
errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. ***, **, * denote significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 
Checks and Balances 
 
Degree of Electoral 
Proportionality 
Dependent variable: MTB ratio 
 
(1) 
Low C&B 
(2) 
High C&B 
(3) 
Low 
proportionality 
 
(4) 
High 
proportionality 
 
Leveraget-1  -0.071 -0.228 -0.145 0.195 
 (0.111) (0.193) (0.109) (0.222) 
EBIT-to-Total Assetst-1 0.215 -0.988 0.210 -0.932 
 (0.142) (0.675) (0.164) (0.471) 
Log of real total assetst-1  -0.158** -0.077 -0.177** -0.381** 
 (0.080) (0.185) (0.085) (0.169) 
Investor Protectiont 0.037 0.078 0.033 0.286** 
 (0.036) (0.142) (0.040) (0.134) 
GDP Growtht 0.043 0.159 0.062 0.077 
 (0.027) (0.116) (0.044) (0.072) 
Government UCRt-1 -0.364*** -0.502 -0.419** -0.542 
 (0.134) (0.464) (0.161) (0.359) 
IRAt-1 -0.142 0.253 -0.087 -0.010 
 (0.097) (0.378) (0.079) (0.242) 
Government UCRt-1 * IRA 0.767*** -0.005 1.011*** 0.307 
 (0.203) (0.638) (0.208) (0.339) 
     
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R squared 0.257 0.369 0.290 0.426 
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 80 [571] 27 [121] 66 [482] 31 [213] 
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Additional Table  -  For the Referees only 
 
Robustness: Market value, ownership and competition effects 
 
The dependent variable is the Market-to-Book ratio defined as (Total Assets - Book Value of Equity + Market Value 
of Equity)/Total Assets). The explanatory variables are defined similarly to Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation.  ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%. 
 
Dependent variable: MTB ratio 
 
(1) 
Low 
Competition 
Sub-sample 
(2) 
Low Competition 
Full sample 
. 
(3) 
Direct effect 
Sub-sample 
 
(4) 
Direct effect 
Full sample 
 
Leveraget-1  -0.096 0.002 -0.248* -0.219* 
 (0.177) (0.109) (0.141) (0.127) 
EBIT-to-Total Assetst-1 0.596 0.533 0.183 0.127 
 (0.408) (0.395) (0.118) (0.097) 
Log of real total assetst-1  -0.315** -0.218** -0.223*** -0.149** 
 (0.137) (0.097) (0.070) (0.077) 
Investor Protectiont 0.034 0.070* -0.064 0.008 
 (0.047) (0.037) (0.060) (0.096) 
GDP Growtht 0.041 0.086** 0.093** 0.094** 
 (0.046) (0.038) (0.045) (0.047) 
IRAt-1 -0.045 -0.065 -1.289** -1.063* 
 (0.115) (0.103) (0.651) (0.628) 
Government UCRt-1 -0.281 -0.295** -3.180 -0.240 
 (0.255) (0.143) (2.051) (1.687) 
Government UCRt-1 * IRA 0.191 0.279 3.284*** 2.434** 
 (0.191) (0.229) (1.209) (1.109) 
OECD Index of Liberalization t-1 - - 0.032 -0.024 
 - - (0.053) (0.044) 
     
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F Test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 45 [317] 76 [560] 57 [424] 64 [473] 
 
 
